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Abstract
Suppes-Sen Dominance is a commonly accepted criterion of impartiality in dis-
tributive justice. Mariotti (1999) characterized the Nash bargaining solution us-
ing Nash (1950)￿ s Scale Invariance (SI) axiom and an axiom named Suppes-Sen
Proofness (SSP) that embodies the Suppes-Sen principle. By adding a relative eq-
uity component to SSP, we ￿rst consider a stronger version of of it, the Strong
Suppes-Sen Proofness (SSSP) property. It turns out that the Egalitarian solution is
the unique solution satisfying SSSP. We then consider two weaker versions of SSP,
namely WSSP and ￿￿WSSP. Yet, it is still possible to characterize the Nash so-
lution by using WSSP and SI only. ￿￿WSSP is much weaker than Weak Pareto
Optimality (WPO) when ￿ = 1. It turns out that it is possible to characterize
the Nash solution by using Individual Rationality (IR), SI and ￿￿WSSP for any
￿ 2 [0;1).
JEL classi￿cation: C78; D74
Keywords: Distributive justice, the Suppes-Sen Proofness, the Nash solution, the
Egalitarian solution.
1 Introduction
Distributive justice concerns how bene￿ts and burdens should be distributed among indi-
viduals in a just manner. Dating back to Aristotle, a variety of principles of distributive
justice have been proposed based on distinct views on the trade-o⁄s between equity
and e¢ ciency.1 The utilitarian principle maximizes the sum of individual utilities, and
hence disregards equity. The egalitarian principle, on the other hand, selects among
￿School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deakin University, 70 Elgar Road, Burwood, VIC
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yWe are grateful to Marco Mariotti for his valuable comments and suggestions.
1See Young (1995) for an excellent survey of concepts of equity and distributive justice.
1all Pareto optimal allocations the one that gives all members of society equal utilities
(complete inequity aversion). John Rawls￿ s Di⁄erence Principle reaches a compromise
between Utilitarianism and Egalitarianism. The Di⁄erence Principle (aka the Maximin
Rule) maximizes the minimum of individual utilities. Thus, an unequal distribution can
be just when it maximizes the bene￿t of the least advantaged members of the society.2
One weak criterion of impartiality in distributive justice is the Suppes-Sen principle.
Given two utility vectors or income distributions s, t 2 R2; s is said to SS-dominate t
if s > t or (s2;s1) > t: The Suppes-Sen principle requires that a choice should not be
SS-dominated. It is a weakening of all three doctrines mentioned above: all of them will
pick a utility vector that is not SS-dominated. Hence, the degree of inequity aversion
could vary dramatically among all alternatives that satisfy the Suppes-Sen principle.
Mariotti (1999) provided the ￿rst ethical interpretation of the Nash solution by pre-
senting a remarkable characterization of the Nash solution using the Suppes-Sen Domi-
nance principle or the Suppes-Sen Proofness (SSP) along with only one of Nash (1950)￿ s
four original axioms, Scale Invariance (SI). SSP invokes an absolute Pareto principle with-
out taking any information regarding personal identity into consideration. Hence, SSP is
a strong e¢ ciency-oriented requirement that also incorporates the symmetry idea. With
such a strong content, in Mariotti (1999)￿ s characterization of the Nash solution, SSP
replaces Nash (1950)￿ s remaining Symmetry (SYM), Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO)
and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) axioms.
As a Pareto e¢ ciency criterion, SSP is a measure in absolute dominance. One could
also consider a measure in relative dominance that highlights the importance of inequality
aversion. This paper considers an equity component alongside with SSP. Given x 2
R2
+nf0g; denote by ￿(x) ￿ min(x1;x2)=max(x1;x2) a measure of inequality. s is said to
E-dominate t if ￿(s) > ￿(t): Consider two alternatives s = (2;2) and t = (1;200): Both
s and t satisfy SSP, as s and t do not SS-dominate each other. The egalitarian principle
will pick s over t as s E-dominates t; but the utilitarian principle will pick t over s: Note
that E-dominance and SS-dominance criteria induce quasi orderings in R2 in a natural
way. Depending on whether we take a union or intersection of these two quasi orderings,
we can either strengthen or weaken SSP from the viewpoint of inequity aversion.
We ￿rst consider a stronger version of SSP which also requires that there should not
be any point in the utility possibility set at which parties￿payo⁄s are relatively more
equitable than at the solution outcome. We call this stronger version the Strong Suppes-
Sen Proofness (SSSP) property. A solution violates SSSP if it is either SS-dominated
2If there is always a positive trade-o⁄ between the utility payo⁄s to di⁄erent individuals, then the
egalitarian and di⁄erence principles lead to the same choice.
2or E-dominated by another feasible allocation. Thus, there are more possibilities for a
solution to violate SSSP than SSP. It turns out that, due to this additional very strong
equity component of SSSP, the Nash solution does not satisfy it but the Egalitarian
solution does. Further, the Egalitarian solution is the unique solution satisfying SSSP;
in other words, with its extremely strong equity content SSSP is su¢ cient to characterize
the Egalitarian solution alone.
We next consider a weaker version of SSP, namely the Weak Suppes-Sen Proofness
(WSSP) property. A solution violates WSSP if it is both SS-dominated and E-dominated
by another feasible allocation. In other words, there are less possibilities for a solution
to violate WSSP than SSSP and than SSP. The latter holds since WSSP is weaker than
SSP as well. Yet, it turns out that it is still possible to characterize the Nash solution
by using WSSP and SI only.
Then we consider another weakening of SSP, which we call ￿￿WSSP. Instead of
considering an absolute level of equality (as SSSP and, to some extent, WSSP do),
￿￿WSSP is more concerned with setting a minimum acceptable level of inequality, ￿ 2
[0;1]. A solution violates ￿￿WSSP if it is SS-dominated by another feasible allocation
s with ￿(s) ￿ ￿. 0￿WSSP is equivalent to SSP (in the ￿rst coordinate), and a solution
violates 1￿WSSP if it is SS-dominated by an Egalitarian alternative. Although in general
WSSP and ￿￿WSSP do not imply each other, when ￿ = 1; ￿￿WSSP is much weaker
than WPO. It turns out that the Nash solution is the unique solution satisfying SI,
Individual Rationality (IR) and ￿￿WSSP for any ￿ 2 [0;1). As ￿ can be arbitrarily
close to 1, it is interesting to ￿nd out that IR, SI and WPO (or ￿￿WSSP) are almost
su¢ cient to characterize the Nash solution uniquely.
2 Basic De￿nitions, Axioms and Our Results
A n-person problem is a pair (S;d); where S ￿ Rn is the set of utility possibilities,
and d 2 S is the disagreement point, which is the utility allocation that results if no
agreement is reached by both parties. It is assumed that (1) S is compact and convex;
(2) S is comprehensive (x; z 2 S implies that y 2 S for all x ￿ y ￿ z), and (3) x > d
for some x 2 S.34 Let ￿ be the class of all n-person problems satisfying (1)-(3). De￿ne
IR(S;d) ￿ fx 2 Sjx ￿ dg; and WPO(S) ￿ fx 2 Sj8x0 2 Rn and x0 > x ) x0 = 2 Sg: For
the purpose of lucid presentation, we consider only two-person bargaining problem in the
main text. In the Appendix, we generalize our results to the n-person case. A solution is
3Given x;y 2 R
n; x > y if xi > yi for each i; and x ￿ y if xi ￿ yi for each i:















a function f : ￿ ! R2 such that for all (S;d) 2 ￿; f 2 S: The Nash solution, N; is such
that its outcome for each (S;d) 2 ￿ is given by N(S;d) = argmaxf(x1￿d1)(x2￿d2)jx 2
IR(S;d)g: The Egalitarian solution, E; is such that its outcome for each (S;d) 2 ￿ is
given by E(S;d) = fx 2 WPO(S)jx1 ￿ d1 = x2 ￿ d2g:
Nash (1950) showed that N is the unique solution that satis￿es the following four
axioms:
Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO): For all (S;d) 2 ￿; f(S;d) 2 WPO(S):
Symmetry (SYM): For all (S;d) 2 ￿; if [d1 = d2; and (x;y) 2 S ) (y;x) 2 S],
then f1(S;d) = f2(S;d):
Scale Invariance (SI): For all (S;d) 2 ￿; T = (T1;T2) : R2 ! R2 is a positive
a¢ ne transformation if T(x1;x2) = (a1x1 + b1;a2x2 + b2) for some positive constants ai
and bi: Then for such a transformation T; f(T(S);T(d)) = T(f(S;d)) holds.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) For all (S;d);(T;d) 2 ￿;if T ￿
S and f(T;d) 2 S; then f(S;d) = f(T;d):




2) ￿ (min(x1;x2);max(x1;x2)) the vector x
with its components listed in ascending order. Mariotti (1999) introduced the following
axiom:
Suppes-Sen Proofness (SSP) If (s ￿ d)" > (f(S;d) ￿ d)"; then s = 2 S:
Figure 1 sheds light on the contents of WPO and SSP. Recall that WPO requires
that f(S;d) 2 WPO(S): In other words, if f(S;d) is the solution in (S;d), then one
cannot ￿nd an allocation in S that strictly dominates f(S;d). Hence any point in the
shaded area cannot possibly be in S. On the other hand, SSP invokes an absolute Pareto
principle - as pointed out by Mariotti (1999) - without taking any information regarding
personal identity into consideration: if f(S;d) is the solution in (S;d), then one cannot
4possibly ￿nd an allocation s in S such that either s or (s2;s1) strictly dominates f(S;d);
￿nding such an s is su¢ cient for a solution to violate SSP. In other words, suppose one
can add points to a utility possibility set S in such a way that the new points already
have their mirror images in S. Then it implies the solution outcome of S should not
be Pareto dominated by any such new point s (or its original mirror image (s2;s1)).
This way, SSP prevents the choice of a utility vector which is ￿rst-order stochastically
dominated. Mariotti (1999) provided the following nice result:
Theorem 1 (Mariotti (1999)) N is the unique solution that satis￿es SSP and SI.
Hence N is the only solution that would not violate SSP whatever utility units turned
out to be those that make utility comparable across individuals.
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> > > > :
1 x = 0
min(x1;x2)
max(x1;x2) x ￿ 0 and x 6= 0
max(x1;x2)
min(x1;x2) x ￿ 0 and x 6= 0
0 otherwise
Based on our construction, 0 ￿ ￿(x) ￿ 1: An allocation is more equitable when ￿(x)
is higher, and ￿(x) = 1 if and only if x1 = x2:5 Consider the following axiom:
Strong Suppes-Sen Proofness (SSSP) If (s￿d)" > (f(S;d)￿d)" or ￿(s￿d) >
￿(f(S;d) ￿ d); then s = 2 S:
Thus, a solution f(S;d) violates SSSP if f(S;d) ￿ d is either SS-dominated or E-
dominated by s￿d for some s 2 S. This makes SSSP a very strong requirement. To see
that compare the left-hand-side part of Figure 2 to both parts of Figure 1. We have the
following result:
Theorem 2 A solution f : ￿ ! R2 satis￿es SSSP if and only if f = E.
Proof. Clearly E satis￿es SSSP. Suppose f satis￿es SSSP. We must have ￿(f(S;d)￿d) =
1; otherwise we can always ￿nd some z 2 S with ￿(z￿d) = 1 > ￿(f(S;d)￿d) and SSSP is
violated. Furthermore, by SSSP, there exists no s 2 S such that (s￿d)" > (f(S;d)￿d)":
Hence f(S;d) 2 WPO(S): Combining these two results, we have f = E:
Now consider the following axiom that is weaker than SSP:
5Given x 2 R
2; another sensible measure of equity could be the shortest distance from x to the
Egalitarian line x1 = x2; that is, the standard deviation of x; ￿(x) =
p
(x1 ￿ x)2 + (x2 ￿ x)2; where
x = (x1+x2)=2: Both ￿(x) and ￿(x) have their pros and cons in measuring inequality, but similar results















Weak Suppes-Sen Proofness (WSSP) If (s￿d)" > (f(S;d)￿d)" and ￿(s￿d) ￿
￿(f(S;d) ￿ d); then s = 2 S:
That is, a solution f(S;d) violates WSSP if f(S;d) ￿ d is both SS-dominated and
(weakly) E-dominated by s ￿ d for some s 2 S. As Figure 2 illustrates, there are more
possibilities for a solution to violate SSP (and thus clearly SSSP) than WSSP.
We have the following result which improves Mariotti (1999)￿ s characterization of the
Nash solution:
Theorem 3 A solution f : ￿ ! R2 satis￿es WSSP and SI if and only if f = N.
Proof. N satis￿es these two axioms. Suppose f satis￿es WSSP and SI. We will show
that f = N: The basic idea of the proof is similar to that of Mariotti (1999). Consider a
problem (S;d) and identify its Nash solution outcome, N(S;d): By SI, we can, without
loss of generality assume, d = 0 ￿ (0;0) and N(S;d) = 1 ￿ (1;1): Suppose to the
contrary that f(S;d) 6= N(S;d) = (1;1): First we observe that fi(S;d) > 0 for some i
￿otherwise it is easy to verify that f violates WSSP: Thus, there are three cases to be
considered:




f1(S;d)f2(S;d)): y < (1;1) and
￿(y) = ￿(1;1): Consider now a positive a¢ ne transformation T de￿ned by T(x1;x2) ￿
(
p





f1(S;d)f2(S;d)) = (T2(f2(S;d));T1(f1(S;d))); and
￿(T(1;1)) = ￿(T(f(S;d))); i.e., T((1;1))" > T(f(S;d))" and ￿(T(1;1)) ￿ ￿(T(f(S;d))):
By WSSP, T(f(S;d)) 6= f(T(S);T(d)); contradicting SI.

















transformation T with T(x1;x2) = (x1; 1
2f2(S;d)x2): We note that T(f(S;d)) = (0; 1
2) <
(T2(1);T1(1)) = ( 1
2f2(S;d);1) and ￿(T(f(S;d))) < ￿(T(1;1)): By WSSP, T(f(S;d)) 6=
f(T(S);T(d)); contradicting SI.
(iii) f1(S;d) < 0 and f2(S;d) > 0 ((the case for f2(S;d) < 0 and f1(S;d) > 0
can be treated analogously): Denote by y ￿ (1
2;2f1(S;d)f2(S;d)): Consider a positive
a¢ ne transformation T de￿ned by T(x1;x2) ￿ (f2(S;d)x1; 1
2x2): Note that T((1;1)) =
(f2(S;d); 1
2) > T(y) = (1
2f2(S;d);f1(S;d)f2(S;d)) = (T2(f2(S;d));T1(f1(S;d))): By
WSSP, T(f(S;d)) 6= f(T(S);T(d)); contradicting SI.
An allocation s can make f(S;d) violate WSSP if s SS-dominates and E-dominates
f(S;d). Instead of insisting in an absolute level of equality (as SSSP and, to some extent,
WSSP do), one may be content with setting a minimum acceptable ratio of inequality
￿ 2 [0;1]. Then s can rule out f(S;d) as an admissible solution if s SS-dominates f(S;d)
and ￿(s ￿ d) is not less than ￿: The following axiom is motivated by this idea:
￿￿Weak Suppes-Sen Proofness (￿￿WSSP) Let ￿ 2 [0;1]: If f(S;d) ￿ d and
there exists s 2 R2 such that (s ￿ d)" > (f(S;d) ￿ d)" and ￿(s ￿ d) ￿ ￿; then s = 2 S:
Figure 3 illustrates the content of ￿￿WSSP. In ￿￿WSSP, we change the component
of WSSP by requiring ￿(s￿d) to be no less then a constant ￿. Therefore, we provide a
one-parameter family of axioms that can be ranked in terms of the demands of inequity
aversion. ￿￿WSSP is weaker than ￿0￿WSSP whenever ￿ > ￿0: Note that 0￿WSSP is
the strongest ￿￿WSSP can be; ￿￿WSSP can be equivalent to SSP, while 1￿WSSP is
the weakest ￿￿WSSP can be. Although WPO and ￿￿WSSP do not imply each other
for ￿ 2 [0;1); 1￿WSSP is much weaker than WPO.
In the following, we provide a lemma that will be used in our next theorem.
Lemma 1 Let ￿ 2 (0;1) and w; z 2 R2
+: If w" > z"; then there exist ￿ 2 (0;1] and a
7positive linear transformation ￿ : R2 ! R2 such that ￿(￿w + (1 ￿ ￿)z)" > ￿(z)" and
￿(￿(￿w + (1 ￿ ￿)z)) ￿ ￿:
Proof. Let (￿;w;z) be a triple that satis￿es the premise. Since w" > z" and z 2 R2
+;
w > 0: As w" > z"; there are two possible cases:
Case 1. (w1;w2) > (z1;z2):6 Consider a positive linear transformation ￿ such that
￿(x1;x2) = (w2
w1x1;x2): We then have ￿(w) = (w2;w2) and ￿(z) = (w2
w1z1;z2): Since
w2 > w2
w1z1 and w2 > z2; ￿(w) > ￿(z); which in turn implies ￿(w)" > ￿(z)": Moreover,
we have ￿(￿(w)) = 1 ￿ ￿: Hence the pair (￿;￿) with ￿(x1;x2) = (w2
w1x1;x2) and ￿ = 1
meets the requirement.
Case 2. (w1;w2) > (z2;z1) and z2 > 0 (the case for z1 > 0 can be treated
analogously): Given ￿ 2 (0;1]; denote by y￿ ￿ (y￿1;y￿2) = ￿w + (1 ￿ ￿)z ￿ (￿w1 +
(1 ￿ ￿)z1;￿w2 + (1 ￿ ￿)z2): As ￿w1 + (1 ￿ ￿)z1 > 0 for ￿ 2 (0;1]; we can always
￿nd some t￿ 2 (0;￿w1 + (1 ￿ ￿)z1): Consider a positive linear transformation ￿￿
such that ￿￿(x1;x2) = (￿￿1(x1);￿￿2(x2)) = (z2x1;t￿x2): Then we have ￿￿(y￿) =
(z2(￿w1 + (1 ￿ ￿)z1);t￿(￿w2 + (1 ￿ ￿)z2)); and ￿￿(z) = (z1z2;t￿z2): We establish the
following claims:
Claim 1. ￿￿(y￿)" > ￿￿(z)" for t￿ su¢ ciently close to ￿w1+(1￿￿)z1: First we observe
that t￿ 2 (0;￿w1 + (1 ￿ ￿)z1) implies ￿￿1(y￿1) = z2(￿w1 + (1 ￿ ￿)z1) > t￿(￿w2 + (1 ￿
￿)z2) = ￿￿2(z2): On the other hand, w" > z" implies w1w2 > z1z2 ￿ 0: Thus, for all
￿ 2 (0;1];
(￿w1 + (1 ￿ ￿)z1)(￿w2 + (1 ￿ ￿)z2) = ￿2w1w2 + (1 ￿ ￿)2z1z2 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(w1z2 + w2z1)
> ￿2z1z2 + (1 ￿ ￿)2z1z2 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(w1z2 + w2z1)
￿ ￿2z1z2 + (1 ￿ ￿)2z1z2 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2
p
(w1z2)(w2z1)
￿ ￿2z1z2 + (1 ￿ ￿)2z1z2 + 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)z1z2
= z1z2:
Hence ￿￿2(y￿2) = t￿(￿w2 + (1 ￿ ￿)z2) > z1z2 = ￿￿1(z1) if we take t￿ su¢ ciently
close to ￿w1 + (1 ￿ ￿)z1: To sum up, ￿￿(y￿)" > ￿￿(z)" for t￿ su¢ ciently close to
￿w1 + (1 ￿ ￿)z1:
Claim 2. ￿(￿￿(y￿)) ￿ ￿ for ￿ su¢ ciently close to 0 and t￿ su¢ ciently close to
￿w1 + (1 ￿ ￿)z1: Since ￿(￿￿(y￿)) ! 1 > ￿ when ￿ is su¢ ciently close to 0 and t￿ is
su¢ ciently close to ￿w1 + (1 ￿ ￿)z1:
Combining these two claims, we show there exists a pair (￿￿;￿) that meets the
requirement.
6Note that (z1;z2) = (0;0) is included in this case.
8Lemma 1 states that if w SS-dominates z; then we can ￿nd a convex combination of
w and z; y; and a positive linear transformation ￿, such that ￿(y) SS-dominates ￿(z)
and ￿(￿(y)) can be arbitrarily close to one.
To establish the next theorem, we need in addition a very weak axiom below that
every known solution so far satis￿es:
Individual Rationality (IR): f(S;d) ￿ d:
Theorem 4 N is the unique solution that satis￿es IR, SI and ￿￿WSSP for any ￿ 2
[0;1).
Proof. The statement is true for ￿ = 0; as 0￿WSSP is equivalent to SSP. Now pick any
￿ 2 (0;1): N satis￿es IR, SI and ￿￿WSSP. Suppose f satis￿es IR, SI and ￿￿WSSP. We
will show that f = N: Consider a problem (S;d) and identify its Nash solution outcome,
N(S;d): By SI, we can, without loss of generality assume, d = (0;0) and N(S;d) = (1;1):
Suppose to the contrary that f(S;d) 6= N(S;d) = (1;1): by IR, f(S;d) ￿ 0: From
the proof of Theorem 2, we know that there exists a positive a¢ ne transformation T
such that T(1;1)" > T(f(S;d))". By Lemma 1, there exist ￿ 2 (0;1] and a positive
linear transformation ￿ such that ￿(￿T(1;1)+(1￿￿)T(f(S;d)))" > ￿(T(f(S;d)))" and
￿(￿(￿T(1;1) + (1 ￿ ￿)T(f(S;d)))) ￿ ￿: Since T(1;1);T(f(S;d)) 2 T(S); by convexity
￿T(1;1)+(1￿￿)T(f(S;d)) 2 T(S); and hence ￿(￿T(1;1)+(1￿￿)T(f(S;d))) 2 ￿￿T(S):
By ￿￿WSSP, ￿(T(f(S;d))) = ￿ ￿ T(f(S;d)) 6= f(￿ ￿ T(S);￿ ￿ T(d)); which violates
SI. Consequently we must have f(S;d) = N(S;d):
As 1￿WSSP puts a strong demand on inequity aversion for an alternative to dominate
a solution, there are potentially uncountably many solutions that can satisfy IR, SI and
1￿WSSP (except for the Proportional solutions and the Equal Sacri￿ce solution all
known solutions satisfy them). Nevertheless, once we strengthen 1￿WSSP slightly, then
N is singled out as the only solution that satis￿es these three axioms. Thus, we can
say that IR, SI and 1￿WSSP (or WPO) are almost su¢ cient to characterize the Nash
solution uniquely. In other words, by putting a slight concept of equality into WPO
along with IR and SI, we have N as the unique solution.
3 Concluding Remarks
Mariotti (1999) opened up a very fruitful avenue in Nash bargaining theory by bring-
ing the Suppes-Sen Dominance (SSD) into the broader picture and by his remarkable
characterization of the Nash solution using an axiom embedding SSD and Nash￿ s SI
axiom only. This provides another dimension in understanding the bargaining solution
concepts, this time in the context of distributive justice.
9It turns out that only a couple of solution concepts, N and E, can clear the bar in
terms of SSD; thus, it seems that many of the heralded bargaining solutions are not cut
well in terms their applicability in distributive justice, if SSD is to be used as the bar.
In this paper, we have ￿rst considered a stronger version of SSP, SSSP, which also
requires that there should not be any feasible allocation at which parties￿payo⁄s are
more equitable than at the solution outcome. It turns out that SSSP is too strong for
N to satisfy it but is su¢ cient to characterize E uniquely.
We then consider a weaker version of the SSSP, namely WSSP. Both components
of SSSP have to be violated together by a solution so that WSSP deems that solution
unsatisfactory. As a result, WSSP is weaker than SSP. However, it is still possible
to characterize N uniquely via WSSP and SI only. Then we have considered another
weaker version of SSSP, namely ￿￿WSSP. ￿￿WSSP sets a minimum acceptable level
of inequality, ￿. When ￿ = 1; ￿￿WSSP is much weaker than WPO. Yet, IR, SI and
￿￿WSSP for any ￿ 2 [0;1) can characterize N uniquely; that is, IR, SI and an axiom
that is much weaker than WPO are almost su¢ cient to characterize the Nash solution
uniquely.
4 Appendix
This appendix generalizes the theorems in the main text to the n-person case. Given









j). First we consider the n-dimensional
version of SSSP:
Strong Suppes-Sen Proofness (SSSP) If (s￿d)" > (f(S;d)￿d)" or ￿ij(s￿d) ￿
￿ij(f(S;d) ￿ d) for all i;j 2 f1;:::;ng with at least one inequality holds strictly; then
s = 2 S:
It is straightforward to show the following:
Theorem 5 A solution f : ￿ ! Rn satis￿es SSSP if and only if f = E.
Next we consider the n-dimensional version of WSSP:
Weak Suppes-Sen Proofness (WSSP) If (s￿d)" > (f(S;d)￿d)" and ￿ij(s￿d) ￿
￿ij(f(S;d) ￿ d) for all i;j 2 f1;:::;ng; then s = 2 S:
Theorem 6 A solution f : ￿ ! Rn satis￿es WSSP and SI if and only if f = N.
Proof. N satis￿es WSSP and SI. Suppose f satis￿es WSSP and SI. We will show that
f = N: Consider a problem (S;d) and identify its Nash solution outcome, N(S;d): By SI,
10we can assume d = 0 and N(S;d) = 1: Suppose to the contrary that f(S;d) 6= N(S;d):
Without loss of generality, we make two assumptions: (i) f(S;d) ￿ 1 ￿otherwise f
violates WSSP, and (ii) f(S;d) = f(S;d)" (by relabeling the coordinates): There are two
possible cases to be considered:
Case 1. f(S;d) > 0: Let t ￿
n p
￿n
i=1fi(S;d) 2 (0;1): Denote v the n ￿ 1 vector with
vi = t for all i 2 f1;:::;ng: Denote by B and C the n ￿ n diagonal matrices with the










0 0 0 ::: 1
1 0 0 ::: 0
0 1 0 ::: 0
. . .







Consider the homogeneous system By=ACy: It can be veri￿ed that the following

























Let D be the n ￿ n diagonal matrix with the components dii = y￿
i for i 2 f1;:::;ng:
Consider a positive linear transformation T : Rn ! Rn such that T(x) = Dx: T(1) =
y￿ > T(v) = ty￿: On the other hand, we have T(f(S;d)) = Df(S;d) = By￿ =
ACy￿ = Aty￿ = AT(v): Therefore T(1)" > T(f(S;d))": Moreover, T(1) = y￿ and
T(f(S;d)) = Aty￿ imply that ￿ij(T(f(S;d))) = ￿ij(T(1)) for all i;j 2 f1;:::;ng: By
WSSP, T(f(S;d)) 6= f(T(S);T(d)); contradicting SI. Hence we must have f = N:
Case 2. f(S;d) ￿ 0: Let 1 ￿ k ￿ n be such that fi(S;d) ￿ 0 for all i ￿ k
and fi(S;d) > 0 for all i > k; i 2 f1;:::;ng: Since f(S;d) ￿ 1; k < n: Pick any























11Let H be the n ￿ n diagonal matrix with the components hii = un￿k+1 for all i 2
f1;:::;k￿1g; and hii = ui￿k+1 for i 2 fk;:::;ng: Consider a positive linear transformation















































































Thus, T(1)" > T(f(S;d))": On the other hand, we observe that ATj(1) ￿ tn￿k
￿n￿k
i=1 fk+i(S;d) ￿
ATl(1) and Tj(f(S;d)) ￿ 0 < Tl(f(S;d)) for all j 2 f1;:::;kg and l 2 fk+1;:::;ng: Hence
￿ij(AT(1)) = 1 ￿ ￿ij(T(f(S;d)) for all i;j 2 f1;:::;kg: Furthermore, we have tATj(1) =
Tj(f(S;d)) for all j 2 fk + 1;:::;ng: Consequently, ￿ij(AT(1)) = ￿ij(T(f(S;d)) for all
i;j 2 fk + 1;:::;ng: Also, for all i 2 f1;:::;kg and j 2 fk + 1;:::;ng; ￿ij(AT(1)) > 0 =
￿ij(T(f(S;d)): To sum up, we have ￿ij(T(1)) ￿ ￿ij(T(f(S;d))) for all i;j 2 f1;:::;ng:
By WSSP, T(f(S;d)) 6= f(T(S);T(d)); contradicting SI. Hence we must have f = N:
In the next, we consider the n-dimensional version of ￿￿WSSP:
￿￿Weak Suppes-Sen Proofness (￿￿WSSP) Let ￿ 2 [0;1]: If f(S;d) ￿ d and
there exists s 2 Rn such that (s ￿ d)" > (f(S;d) ￿ d)" and ￿ij(s ￿ d) ￿ ￿ for all
i;j 2 f1;:::;ng; then s = 2 S:
The following is the n-dimensional version of Lemma 1:
Lemma 2 Let ￿ 2 (0;1) and w; z 2 Rn
+: If w" > z"; then there exist ￿ 2 (0;1] and a
positive linear transformation ￿ : Rn ! Rn such that ￿(￿w + (1 ￿ ￿)z)" > ￿(z)" and
￿ij(￿(￿w + (1 ￿ ￿)z)) ￿ ￿ for all i;j 2 f1;:::;ng:
Proof. Let (￿;w;z) be a triple that satis￿es the premise. Since w" > z" and z 2 Rn
+;
w > 0: Let A be the n ￿ n permutation matrix de￿ned previously. Without loss of
generality, assume zi = 0 for i ￿ k ￿ n; and zi > 0 for all i > k (k = 0 when z > 0):
There are three cases:
Case 1. k = n (z = 0): Let M be the n ￿ n diagonal matrix with the components
mii = ￿n
j6=iwj for all i 2 f1;:::;ng: Consider a positive linear transformation ￿ : Rn ! Rn
such that ￿(x) = Mx: It is easy to verify that ￿ = 1 and ￿ meet the requirement.
12Case 2. 1 < k < n: Given ￿ 2 (0;1]; denote by y￿ ￿ (y￿1;:::;y￿n) = ￿w + (1 ￿ ￿)z:
For each i 2 f1;:::;ng; pick t￿ = (t￿1;:::;t￿n) such that t￿i 2 (0;y￿i) for i = 1;:::;n: Let
G be the n ￿ n diagonal matrix with the components
gii =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
￿k
j=2t￿j￿n
j=k+1zj i = 1




j=i+1t￿j i = k + 2;:::;n ￿ 1
￿k
j=1t￿j￿i￿1
j=k+1zj i = n
Consider a positive linear transformation ￿￿ : Rn ! Rn such that ￿￿(x) ￿ (￿￿1(x);:::;￿￿n(x)) =

















































































































































Hence ￿￿(y￿)">￿￿(z)": Moreover, it is easy to see that lim￿!0 limt￿!y￿ ￿￿i(y￿) =
￿n
j=1zj for i = 1;:::;n: Therefore lim￿!0 limt￿!y￿ ￿ij(￿￿(y￿)) = 1 > ￿ for all i;j 2
f1;:::;ng: Accordingly, there exists a pair (￿￿;￿) that meets the requirement.
Case 3. k = 0 or 1: Given ￿ 2 (0;1]; denote by y￿ ￿ (y￿1;:::;y￿n) = ￿w + (1 ￿ ￿)z:
For each i 2 f1;:::;ng; pick t￿ = (t￿1;:::;t￿n) 2 (0;y￿): Let ￿ be the n ￿ n diagonal
13matrix with the components
￿ii =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
￿n
j=2zj i = 1
￿j6=2t￿j i = 2
t￿1￿i￿1
j=2zj￿n
j=i+1t￿j i = 3;:::;n ￿ 1
t￿1￿n￿1
j=2zj i = n
Consider a positive linear transformation ￿￿ : Rn ! Rn such that ￿￿(x) ￿ (￿￿1(x);:::;￿￿n(x)) =






















































Obviously (￿￿(y￿))j > (A￿￿(z))j for j 6= 2: We show that (￿￿(y￿))2 = y￿2￿j6=2t￿j >
(A￿￿(z))2 = ￿n
j=1zj if we take t￿ su¢ ciently close to y￿: By Minkowski￿ s inequality (e.g.
Horn and Johnson (1990), p.482) and the fact that w" > z" implies ￿jwj > ￿jzj,7
￿jy￿j = ￿j(￿wj + (1 ￿ ￿)zj) ￿ [(￿j￿wj)
1









n + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿jzj)
1
n]n = ￿jzj:
Hence (￿￿(y￿))2 > (A￿￿(z))2 if we take t￿ su¢ ciently close to y￿: In other words,
￿￿(y￿)">￿￿(z)" for t￿ su¢ ciently close to y￿: Again, it is easy to see that lim￿!0 limt￿!y￿ ￿￿i(y￿) =
￿n
j=1zj for i = 1;:::;n: Therefore lim￿!0 limt￿!y￿ ￿ij(￿￿(y￿)) = 1 > ￿ for all i;j 2
f1;:::;ng: Accordingly, there exists a pair (￿￿;￿) that meets the requirement.
Taking the same line of argument used in Theorem 4, we are able to show the
following:
7Minkowski￿ s inequality in matrix form: If A and B are non-negative Hermitian n￿n matrices, then
det(A + B) ￿ [(det A)
1




14Theorem 7 A solution f : ￿ ! Rn satis￿es IR, SI and ￿￿WSSP for any ￿ 2 [0;1) if
and only if f = N.
Remark. As pointed out by Mariotti (1999), N satis￿es a property stronger than
SSP named Generalized Lorenz Proofness (GLP). f satis￿es SSP if s > Pf(S;d) for
some permutation matrix P implies s = 2 S: f satis￿es GLP if s > Bf(S;d) for some
bistochastic matrix B implies s = 2 S: GLP has a slightly stronger concept of equity than
SSP (but weaker than SSSP). All our SSSP, WSSP and ￿-WSSP can be replaced by
SGLP, WGLP and ￿-WGLP without changing any results. SGLP is equivalent to SSSP,
but WGLP (￿-WGLP) is stronger than WSSP (￿-WSSP).
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